Dreams from the Dark Years: Vichy Syndrome
By Paul Hynes.
Vichy is enjoying a comeback. For over a century the town has been famous as a tourist destination for the wealthy across the world. Spas making use of the mineral rich waters have long attracted those afflicted with various ailments from afar. The elaborate hotels, casinos and opera have been a draw for the entourages of those in need of the waters. Tourism has increased significantly as has funding from the French state, and in 2021 the town was awarded UNESCO world heritage status.
Heritage has once again become lucrative but throughout this tourism boom one hotel remains closed. Like many hotels in Vichy the Hotel du Parc is a grand old building with elaborate architecture. Its ground floor once featured a dedicated Louis Vuitton store but is now a lobby for various holiday lets and private flats. One can only be accessed by members of a secretive far-right organisation.
The old hotel’s exterior bears a plaque dedicated to the 76,000 Jews who were deported from France during the Holocaust. The owners of the building removed it only for the town officials to eventually step in and insist it remain, which it does despite repeated attempts to deface it. It was placed there by Holocaust survivor and Nazi hunter Serge Klarsfeld in 1992 on the anniversary of the largest round-up of Jews in France which the regime based in the hotel had coordinated.
This article is not about the wonderful history of an exotic spa town but how the regime based in it came into existence. This article is about how democracy died in France.
“If you leave the soil of France you will never set foot on it again”
Ever since the French government had moved from Paris to Bordeaux the city had become a breeding ground for those wishing to kill off French democracy. The Third Republic had survived numerous challenges from within and without France but the extent of the defeat in the May and June of 1940 had made many of its detractors smell blood. It is perhaps fitting that the man who had proven himself a creature of the Third Republic would be the one to finally kill it off.
Pierre Laval had originally come into French politics as a Socialist. The son of a relatively well-off innkeeper, he had grown up comfortably but amongst the working class. Laval would later claim his Socialism had always been inspired more out of a sympathy for the downtrodden rather than Marxist doctrine. This explanation does not bear up to much scrutiny, as we shall see at the height of his power he would target the most vulnerable people in French society for specific acts of cruelty. Nonetheless he got his start as a provincial lawyer defending workers against their bosses. This was a background shared by many left-wing French politicians, a provincial former lawyer became a rather stereotypical backstory for deputies in the Third Republic.
By the end of the First World War Laval would be a deputy in the French assembly and soon proved to be a political animal. While his Socialist colleagues sought the greater involvement of the working masses, Laval was happiest amongst the gossip and intrigue in the halls of power. Rarely seen without a cigarette, he believed in the power of a smoke filled room. Backslapping, handshakes and friendships were the best ways of governing the nation.
Laval enjoyed considerable political success with this outlook and he would be a fixture in many interwar governments. Although Laval had dispensed with most of his political beliefs along the way, the pacifism of his socialist years remained strong. After campaigning against the Treaty of Versailles, he would spend the interwar years attempting to reintegrate Germany into a peaceful Europe however the rise of Nazism made him seek allies for France.
In particular Laval would seek to build strong relations with Fascist Italy which would prove to be his undoing. In 1935 Italy launched an unprovoked invasion of Ethiopia and a brutal war ensued. The Italian aggression angered many within the British and French publics and both powers were obliged to place economic sanctions on Italy for its violation of international law.
Laval, currently serving as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, would work alongside the British Foreign Minister Samuel Hoare in an attempt to placate Mussolini. They feared the Duce might align Italy with Germany if he was not appeased and so offered large parts of Ethiopian territory to Italy in exchange for peace. Mussolini rejected this compromise and the revelation of the negotiations caused outcry in France and the UK. Laval would be forced to resign shortly after.
From the sidelines Laval would observe the sanctions fail to stop Italy from overrunning Ethiopia and shortly after Mussolini would ally himself with Hitler. The incident would strengthen his belief that the big issues of Europe could only be resolved by compromise safe from public indignation. His view of democracy went from dismissal to hostility; he continued to admire Mussolini and began to develop an affection for Hitler. In 1939 he opposed the war and waited to return to the government in order to make peace. Many, even his detractors on the far-right, felt he would be a good fit for such a task.
Having reached Bordeaux he argued in favour of peace and against fighting on from the empire. He soon returned to power as Pétain’s deputy.
The Massilia Affair
The diminishing number of figures within the government who believed France should fight on had believed that even if an armistice was asked for, the German terms might prove too harsh. It was with this expectation Paul Reynaud had handed power to Pétain. Reynaud’s former Interior Minister, George Mandel, former Prime Minister Eduoard Daladier and other like-minded parliamentarians had proposed moving at least part of the government to North Africa to ensure that the French government couldn’t be held hostage to German demands should Bordeaux be captured.
Having received permission from his replacement as Interior Minister, Mandel and a group of 26 other parliamentarians set sail on the SS Massilia on the 21st of June at the same time General Charles Hunzinger was negotiating the armistice they sought to prevent. It was a doomed voyage and it has been speculated that the permission was only granted for the venture in the knowledge it would remove Mandel and his allies from Bordeaux at a critical moment.
By the time the Massilia reached Casablanca on the 24th of June the armistices with Germany and Italy had been signed. The commander of French forces in North Africa, General Charles Noguès, had implored his government to fight on but now deferred to Pétain’s instructions. He kept the politicians confined and under close surveillance. They were prevented from making contact with a British delegation which had arrived to meet with them or from returning to France.
When they eventually did return starting at the end of July they did so in custody and disgrace. Although Mandel had received permission to make the voyage he and his allies were faced with charges of desertion. The Minister of the Interior had changed again, now being the fascist Adrien Marquet who publicly derided those who had left France defenceless then abandoned her.
Occupation Begins
On the 25th of June the armistices signed with Germany and Italy came into effect. Maréchal Philippe Pétain had secured the end to the fighting he had believed was necessary ever since he had rejoined the French government in May. Now he was Prime Minister and responsible for the path of national renewal he had declared necessary for France to recover from its current woes.
The nation was in a truly sorry state. Three-fifths of metropolitan France were now under Axis control. A quarter of a million French soldiers were casualties and more than a million and a half were now being taken to Germany as prisoners. Perhaps as many as ten million French civilians had taken to the road and most had nowhere to go.
Pétain expressed genuine sympathy for the refugees but the implications of the exodus were just as horrific to him. Local institutions and representatives had often fled with their people, creating a vacuum in much of Northern France. Chaos was worse than defeat for Pétain and his peers. Such was the scale of the crisis that there was a broad recognition of the emergencies requiring a more authoritarian approach.
However, before the new government could work on getting people back their homes it had to find one of its own. The temporary capital of Bordeaux was no longer viable now it sat within the German occupation zone. Pétain’s government took to the road in search of somewhere to operate in the new ‘Free Zone’.
Pétain intended for his regime to ultimately be housed in Versailles outside Paris, where the Ancien Regime had ruled in a gilded bubble prior to the first French revolution. This move was intended to harken back to that era, when France had been the most powerful nation in continental Europe based on its peasantry before the chaos of republicanism had laid her low. There were provisions in the armistice for the French government to be allowed to return to Paris but it was accepted negotiating this might take some time. British surrender and a final peace deal with Germany was expected to resolve these issues but in the meantime Pétain needed a stop gap.
Choosing Vichy
There were other cities in unoccupied France such as Marseille and Nice but various reasons made them unattractive. Organised crime and left-wing agitation were usually the main reasons given. However, as Pétain would soon make clear, his regime would reject the cosmopolitan nature of urban environments in favour of the traditional values of the rural peasantry. To the new French premier the concept of the city itself was the basis for all of France’s current woes; Marxism, secularism and the indulgences which had made the French people unwilling to sacrifice.
The government reached the village of Clemont-Ferrard but the stay was brief. It was too small, the mayor was too left-wing, and Laval controlled the local paper. What was needed was a place with plenty of large buildings for government ministries with excellent communications and could access Paris quickly when the time came for the government to return to the French capital or Versailles.
Vichy ticked all of those boxes. It boasted ample hotels and an excellent telephone exchange due to the swathes of wealthy holidaymakers. It would be the perfect layover, the only real option for a regime passionately opposed to the concept of cities. The downsides, such as Vichy being a summer holiday destination whose hotels lacked central heating, were dismissed given the government would no longer be there when winter came.
“A new order is beginning”
The question remained of what sort of government would be leaving Vichy. Ever since Bordeaux anti-republican elements had been circling and with Pétain in power they had now seized control of the Third Republic. The shock and despair of the defeat would make many who had spent their political lives defending the republican more amenable to the idea that perhaps France needed something new.
Symptoms were being diagnosed and prescriptions were being written all based on the right-wing anxieties of the interwar era. Marxist educators were alleged to have turned children against France. The Popular Front with its paid holidays and 40 hour week had been symptomatic of the preference for pleasure over sacrifice. General Weygand honoured the sacrifice of his own French troops but condemned French women for having forced him to rely on soldiers from the French empire whom he blamed for France’s defeat. Pétain agreed, in addressing the reasons for defeat to the French people he blamed ‘Too few Allies, too few weapons, too few children.’
Pétain’s analysis of the situation was short and simplistic, but in the crisis it seemed to capture the national mood. He spoke of suffering and warned it would go on for some time but promised redemption. His remarks are reminiscent of Churchill’s speeches around the same time with their candour and talk of trials to come; however, Pétain was quick to emphasise any Frenchmen who wished to continue fighting were ill-informed. The root to national revival for him was to come in at least part of France being independent and administered by Frenchmen. In offering the French people what he termed the ‘gift of his person’ he was declaring himself their dictator.
It is important to remember there was nothing in the armistice which stipulated France would have to become an authoritarian regime. The Germans signed the armistice with what was still the Third Republic and it could theoretically have continued. In Denmark, the Social Democratic government continued under German occupation following the Dane’s own surrender to German ‘protection’ in exchange for administrative autonomy. They even held a relatively free election in 1943. It is likely that France, which had even more autonomy in their arrangement, could have done the same.
Pétain had lost any love he ever had for democracy but he remained a legalist. Proclaiming a dictatorship recklessly could heighten the chaos he was seeking to resolve. It was only a fortnight since reports had spread of the French Communists seizing control of Paris. Much of France was without any leadership and lacked access to basic services.
As the Germans had signed the armistice with the Third Republic, dissolving it could lead them to alter the terms or impose a government they found more favourable. They were already subverting the armistice. In Alsace and Lorraine, the Swastika flag flew and the regions were annexed into Germany despite the agreement France would administer its occupied territory. In Brittany, Breton separatists were being encouraged to prepare for independence by occupying authorities. Everywhere in the occupied zone posters went up encouraging the French population to place their trust in the Wehrmacht rather than their own government which was often nowhere to be found. .
What Pétain needed was a swift imposition of his authority and a legal means of dispensing with the Third Republic. For that he needed Pierre Laval. Pétain had never been fond of Laval, the provincial former lawyer with a penchant for backroom deals personified everything those on the right hated about French democracy. It was also alleged Laval had a habit of blowing cigarette smoke into his face. Nonetheless Laval made himself useful, his far greater constitutional expertise and political skill would allow him to deliver Pétain’s dictatorship.
“France has never had and never will have a more bitter enemy than Great Britain”
Laval proposed a straightforward way to enable Pétain’s dictatorship. He would convene a National Assembly, the combination of the Republic’s Chamber of Deputies and Senate which could vote to make constitutional amendments. Laval would convince them to vote to provide Pétain’s government sole power to make all laws as he saw fit. Effectively it would be an enabling act.
The plan received cautious support on the basis that should it fail Laval could be blamed. Pétain went with Laval to meet with the French President, Albert Lebrun, to discuss the proposal.
In the meantime, French deputies and senators streamed into Vichy. Those in the occupied zone had to rely on foreign radio broadcasts to find out where the government was now based, as the armistice had stipulated radio broadcasts from the free zone would be jammed. Many parliamentarians had been caught up amongst the vast columns of refugees making their way across France. It not only delayed many but left them deeply impacted on the need to do something quickly to relieve the chaos and suffering.
Arriving in Vichy they would find Laval holding court in the Casino working hard to convince any sceptical colleagues that in the new regime he would ensure himself and his allies would be the ones truly in charge. Pétain could be seen touring the town, flanked by his guards and cheered on by his admirers. In the distance loomed more ominous threats, the Germans a few miles away. General Weygand’s troops were even closer. The fascist street thugs under the control of Jacques Doriot actively threatened parliamentarians.
Among this mix of awe, intimidation and persuasion came another shock: one which Laval would use to launch his campaign against democracy. On the 3rd of July the British launched Operation Catapult which culminated in the treacherous attack on Mers el-Kebit. The story of this tragic event is detailed in the last article but the greatest consequences would arguably be felt in Vichy.
Many deputies were already reeling from the shock of the news when Laval gathered them the following day. He announced that the government had decided not to declare war against the UK but that France would need to change its government to fit the ‘totalitarian’ mould of Germany and Italy. He condemned British betrayal and elaborated on how the British had sabotaged his peace initiatives in the thirties and had manipulated their alliance. He emphasised his good relations with Mussolini and promised that by moving in between Germany and Italy, France could find a way out of its current predicament.
The audience was stupefied. In reality there had never been any question of declaring war against the UK or of the Axis powers demanding France adopt a totalitarian government. By conjuring these threats Laval had attempted to make his aim of a pro-Axis dictatorship look moderate and sensible. He was broadly successful and for the next few days he would hold information sessions in which he would deliver monologues against the UK and the republic. He would then turn to individual conversations to convince doubters of what he had said.
“My duty is calmly to defy the injustice and hatred that have been set loose in the land”
What remained to oppose Laval? The French Communist Party had been banned the previous year and its deputies and senators removed. However, the National Assembly was still mostly composed of Liberals and Socialists, indeed it included most of the same deputies who had ushered in the Popular Front in 1936. Such people could be expected to vote against the imposition of a dictatorship. In reality most would vote in favour.
The conditions specific to Vichy surrounded by the catastrophe of the defeat provided several reasons for this outcome beyond Laval's political skill. There were some such as Jean Taurines who voted to hand power over to Pétain on the understanding power would be relinquished when the crisis was over. Laval did not discourage such people with the constitutional acts pledging that any new constitution would have legislative oversight. Others were perhaps seduced by Laval's promises that men like themselves would actually be running things behind the guise of Pétain's dictatorship.
There were also those who had become convinced the Third Republic had failed France or at least that some sort of overhaul was required. This included Pierre Flandin, a lifelong republican who had become convinced that national salvation could only come from abandoning democratic principles. He did not believe France should imitate Nazi Germany but believed only an authoritarian French state could stand up to them.
In both examples we can see where political belief intersects with material reality, particularly when conditions are severe. In a crisis of this magnitude most were unable to stick to their principles. Some chose to abandon them as a necessary evil; others did so gladly.
A third contingent were simply rudderless. While Pétain symbolised power and Laval worked feverishly to bring as many along with him as possible, the opposition was divided and leaderless. Daladier, Mandel and others who have built opposition to the dictatorship were stuck in Casablanca. Reynaud had fallen into a depression following the death of his partner in a car crash.
Leon Blum arrived late to Vichy on the 4th of July, after Laval had already made his address. The man who was made the caricature for the republic's woes by its detractors was perhaps a fitting leader in the attempt to save it. Like Laval, Blum was a former lawyer, a brilliant political tactician and skilled orator. Unlike Laval he was not inclined to act as a windsock for his own ends. Four years previously he had almost been lynched for his beliefs but remained consistent.
Already on the evening of the 4th Blum had confronted Laval at the casino and forced him to admit his plans for censoring the press in his new regime. Afterwards he had sought to organise a meeting of all Socialist deputies and senators with the intent of building a united opposition to Laval. The meeting of the Socialist parliamentary group was anything but united, however. Blum’s supporters verbally clashed with those of another leading Socialist, Paul Faure, who had never abandoned his pacifism and had always believed Germany and Italy had been oppressed by the peace treaties of the last war. Now he saw in the armistice and Pétain the chance to build a lasting peace in Europe.
Some of Faure’s colleagues went further, hurling antisemitic insults at Blum. One deputy, Jean Mistlet, allegedly tried to attack the former Prime Minister. These men were not immune to the scapegoating of Jews and the Popular Front which had been going on at Vichy and their reaction to those trying to shake them out of their self-flagellation was hostile. Disheartened, Blum abandoned his attempts to unite the Socialists in defence of the republic. He would continue to speak in its defence in the following days but it would sound increasingly mournful.
“The act which we are accomplishing today, we accomplish freely”
In the end there was no organised resistance to the assault on French democracy. What there was instead was nitpicking. A group of Senators who were veterans of the last war supported handing power to Pétain but demanded they get guarantees on what should come after. Laval dealt with this by tangling the group in the legality of their counterproposal and effectively made them his allies.
On the 9th of July the proposal for constitutional change passed the Council of Ministers. It proposed Pétain would have full power to act but following a final peace agreement with Germany he would seek to relinquish his power. He was tasked with drafting a new constitution in the meantime which would have some sort of democratic oversight although what form this would take was vague. In essence Pétain had full power with no real checks or balances. He would nominate his own successor should he become incapacitated. For the first time since 1792 France would return to an absolute monarchy. There were only a handful of dissenters. The following day the National Assembly met to vote on the proposal.
There was a large contingent of monarchists in the National Assembly led by Raphael Alibert who were very supportive of these proposals, but Laval also deliberately made it clear he had the support of Flandin to emphasise support across the political spectrum. He spoke of how from now on there would be only one party, one coalition, that of France. It was a patriotic, almost apolitical call which many found attractive. It promised to transcend the obstruction and factionalism of the Third Republic as well as the backroom deals Laval himself had thrived in. As we shall see in later articles there were individuals who tried to make this vision a reality but they were unsuccessful and Laval was not one of them.
The National Assembly met in Vichy's Opera House, not dissimilar from the Kroll Opera House in Berlin where Hitler's dictatorship received its legislative stamp in 1933. In both cases it followed in the wake of a tragedy; the Reichstag Fire in 1933 and Mers El Kebir in 1940. Both were blamed on convenient opponents of the incoming regime. On both occasions there were fascist gangs outside threatening the parliamentarians. The result was also similarly lopsided.
In Berlin 444 had voted to hand Hitler power against 91. In Vichy 569 voted to hand Pétain even greater power against only 80. In the case of Germany those voting had been elected during the heavily rigged election of 1933 whereas in France it was the same deputies which had helped usher in the Popular Front. In Germany those Social Democrats still in the Reichstag had been decried as ‘Social Fascists’ by Communist opponents but voted unanimously to block Hitler. In France the Socialist party had successfully worked with the Communists to keep out Fascism but now a majority of its representatives voted to hand full powers to Pétain. The Radical Party which had been formed in defence of the Republic had an even higher share of its members voting for its demise.
The session ended with one of the opponents, Marcel Astier shouting, “Long live the Republic, all the same!” He was drowned out by shouts of “Long live France!”
Everybody's Free (To Wear Sunscreen)
There remains some dispute about whether The Third Republic was dissolved legally or whether Pétain’s rise to power reflected a coup after all. It is unclear whether the National Assembly had the power to dissolve itself and other Republican institutions. In 1944 General Charles de Gaulle simply declared the republic had never ceased to exist and rendered all Vichy decrees null and void.
If the vote truly was illegal, it had little bearing at the time. The tactics used by Pétain and his lieutenants involved lies and intimidation, but it is undeniable there was widespread popularity for the return of stability and the chance at national redemption Pétain seemed to promise.
This was not limited to France either. Outside of the British and their allies every major power recognised Vichy, including the USA and USSR. Although the new French regime broke off relations with the UK, the British also hesitated to recognise an alternative French regime. De Gaulle would continue largely in vain throughout July to rally Frenchmen to his cause but those still in the UK were warned by their British hosts that doing so could amount to treachery. The vast majority returned home in short order, leaving de Gaulle with only a few thousand French supporters.
The French Empire also largely fell in line often with great enthusiasm from colonial administrators who had been hostile to the Popular Front and subsequent attempts to humanise the colonies. Vichy’s new Colonial Secretary got to work purging pro-British or pro-Gaullist elements from the empire. A few islands in the South Pacific would rally to de Gaulle but it would take until August for events in Equatorial Africa to give the Free French a real base to build their movement outside of London.
By then the government at Vichy was growing used to its new surroundings but waited impatiently to begin negotiating the final peace treaty which would allow them to regain control of Northern France and establish a more permanent capital. The British had not come to terms as had been expected and the Luftwaffe was defeated over the skies of England. There was a growing anxiety that the war and the conditions of the armistice might leave Pétain’s new dictatorship stuck at Vichy for longer than expected. The new regime which had promised a dynamic French renewal was instead stuck in limbo.
Next time we will explore Vichy’s consolidation of power and how this spread across the French controlled world. The promises of the new regime will begin to collide with the reality they have found themselves in. We will see how two men from French colonies sought to save France; one who chose to enforce Vichy’s new order and one who chose to rebel.
Paul Hynes is the author of the Decisive Darkness series and the Red Fuhrer series.
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